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Co:NFLicr OF LAws-FuLL FAITH AND CRBDrr-FoRBIGN CusTODY DE· 
crums - Husband and wife were domiciled in Wisconsin. When marital 
troubles developed, the parties agreed that the wife should. take their children 
to Ohio and. there decide on her future action. Shortly afterward the wife 
informed the husband. she was not returning. The husband secured. a divorce 
in Wisconsin, with the decree purporting to award. him custody of the 
children subject to visitation rights in the wife. Service on the wife was 
· obtained by publication, but she made no appearance in the Wisconsin pro-
ceedings. After one of the visits of the children, the wife refused. to return 
them and. the husband filed a petition for habeas corpus1 in Ohio, relying 
upon the Wisconsin decree. The Ohio intermediate appellate court affirmed 
the probate court's order that the wife give up the children, holding that 
Wisconsin had jurisdiction to render a binding decree since it was the chil-
dren's domicile.2 The state supreme court dismissed an appeal.3 On certiorari, 
the United States Supreme Court held, reversed, three justices dissenting. 
Where a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a parent, its decree cutting off 
the parent's immediate right to custody of minor children need. not be accorded. 
full faith and. credit. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840 (1953). 
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided. whether a foreign custody 
decree is entitled. to full faith and. credit under the Constitution,4 and. the 
present case leaves that question still unresolved. However, of the eight 
participating justices only Justice Frankfurter, concurring, voiced. a .Bat ob-
jection to the application of traditional full faith concepts to child custody 
decrees. To six justices the case presented. the familiar issue of what constitutes 
the requisite jurisdictional basis to :render a decree binding on other states.I> 
Two of these justices believed. that domicile of the child plus that of one parent 
suffices;6 while not disputing that domicile of the child. is necessary, the other 
four decided that there must also be personal jurisdiction over the parent sought 
to be bound. 7 In the instant case that parent had. possession of the child. 
outside the jurisdiction purportedly awarding custody, but the Court is not 
wholly clear about the significance of this fact.8 The division within the 
1 Under Ohio procedure the writ of habeas corpus "tests only the immediate right to 
possession of the children." Principal case at 532; In re Corey, 145 Ohio St. 413, 61 N.E. 
(2d) 892 (1945). In some states the court may determine the future custody of the children 
in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., People of State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. 
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947). 
2 Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E. (2d) 358 (1951). 
a Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N.E. (2d) 648 (1952). 
4 U.S. CONST., art. IV, §1. See People of State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 
note I supra; Ehrenzweig, ''Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees," 51 l\hCH. L. REv. 
345 at 356-357 (1953). 
G Justice Minton, dissenting, thought the jurisdictional question was not properly raised 
and that the Wisconsin decree was entitled on its face to full faith and credit. 
6 Justices Jackson and Reed, dissenting. 
7 Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court, joined in by Chief Justice Vinson 
and Justices Black and Douglas. 
8 It has been held that where the child is outside the state a court cannot render a 
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Supreme Court is mirrored in state decisions and textual writing. The Restate-
1nent, to which the majority of the courts at least pay lip service, declares 
that only the state of the child's domicile has jurisdiction to make a binding 
custody award.9 This view is based on the theory that custody is a matter of 
status to be controlled by the state of domicile, 10 but it is open to the serious 
objection that the technical rules of domicile may not provide a realistic 
determination of the state most interested in the child's welfare.11 Some courts, 
emphasizing the claims of the parents, maintain that personal jurisdiction over 
the parents is sufficient regardless of the domicile or whereabouts of the child.12 
Others stress the position of the state as parens patriae and hold that residence 
or physical presence of the child within the state confers jurisdiction to award 
custody.13 Legal writers have challenged the reliability of these "rules," asserting 
that a scrutiny of the actual holdings of the cases shows: (1) courts of any 
states having a substantial interest in the welfare of the child exercise con-
current jurisdiction to determine custody;14 and (2) although such courts 
feel free to change custody awards, they will generally enforce a foreign decree 
where non-enforcement would benefit a parent with "unclean hands."10 While 
binding custody award without personal jurisdiction over both parents. Carter v. Carter, 
201 Ga. 850, 41 S.E. (2d) 532 (1947). See May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N.Y.S. 
606 (1931). In neither of these cases was the court explicit as to the state of the child's 
domicile. Cf. Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928) (award not binding 
where child was neither domiciled nor present in the jurisdiction). 
OCoNPLICT OF LA.ws Rl!STA.T.El\lENT §117 (1934); GOODRICH, CoNPLICT OF LA.ws, 
3d ed., 421 (1949); Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 P. 987 (1928); Callahan v. 
Callahan, 296 Ky. 444, 177 S.W. (2d) 565 (1944); annotation, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 434 
(1950). Generally there is also personal jurisdiction over both parents. But see Minick 
v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 S. 483 (1933) (court awarded custody where child domiciled 
in forum was residing with absent parent). 
1o Goodrich, "Custody of Children in Divorce Suits," 7 CoRN. L.Q. 1 at 2-3 (1921). 
11 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," IO LA.w .AND CoNT.BM. 
Pnon. 819 at 820-823 (1944). In extreme cases the child has never lived in the state of 
domicile. Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N.J. Misc. 98, 176 A. 589 (1935). 
12 Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914); May v. May, note 8 
supra (dictum). 
13 De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896); Kenner v. 
Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1918) (upholding foreign decree rendered in ex 
parte proceeding); see Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); annotation, 
4 A.L.R. (2d) 7 (1949). This view finds support in STW,D!BRG, CoNPLICT OF LA.ws, 2d 
ed., 327 (1951). 
14 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 LA.w AND 
CoNTE.M. Pnon. 819 at 831-832 (1944). See Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W. 
(2d) 220 (1941); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 763, 197 P. (2d) 739 (1948). 
The substantial interest necessary to support a state's concurrent jurisdiction might be domi-
cile or residence of the child. See 50 MrcH. L. REv. 602 (1952); 9 A.L.R. (2d) 434 at 
441-442 (1950). 
la Ehrenzweig, "Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees," 51 M:rCH. L. REv. 345 
esp. at 357 et seq. (1953). See also McMillin v. McMillin., 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. (2d) 
444 (1945); Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. (2d) 419, 174 P. (2d) 790 (1946); Stansbury, 
"Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," IO LA.w AND CoNT.SM. Pnon. 819 
at 829 (1944). Query as to the im1>0rt of the Court's reference in the principal case at 
535, n. 8, to the "special considerations" that arise when a parent acts in bad faith. 
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the result of the principal case could be justified on these bases, the reasoning 
of the Court is unlikely to lessen the confusion in a field sorely in need of 
clarification. The majority opinion is ambiguous, 16 and seems to uphold the 
applicability of the full faith and credit clause to child custody decrees through 
an uncritical acceptance of the authority of cases involving property rights 
and the marital status.17 Most regrettably, the Court concerns itself primarily 
with the claims of the parents rather than with the welfare of the child.18 It 
thus ignores what are really the two chief competing policy factors in this area: 
the need to protect the child from endless litigation over his custody, and the 
need to enable custody awards by the court most qualified at any given time 
to determine the child's best interests. Apparently experience has convinced 
the courts that the second factor is paramount.19 Since this is so it would 
seem desirable to limit the possible applicability of the full faith and credit 
clause in custody cases by making prior adjudications binding only on the 
parents, leaving the forum state free as parens patriae to look after the welfare 
of the child.20 It might be questioned whether this distinction is much more 
than a verbalism, but at least it may satisfy the Supreme Court's full faith 
requirements until an ultimate solution is found for the custody problem.21 
Treating the award of a child's custody like a judgment for alimony payments 
is hardly such a solution. 
Theodore]. St. Antoine¥ S.Ed. 
16 Justice Frankfurter thought the Court was deciding that Ohio need not enforce the 
WISConsin decree; Justice Jackson, that Ohio must not enforce it. 
17 The state of the plaintiff's domicile may make a binding dissolution of the man:iage 
status, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942), but per..onal 
jurisdiction over the defendant is necessary to terminate a spouse's right under a prior ali-
mony decree, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S.Ct. 1213 (1948). Only Justice Frank-
furter deemed a custody decree unique and governed by neither of the foregoing rules. 
18 It is axiomatic that the child's welfare is the principal consideration in custody cases. 
MADDEN, DoMEsnc Rm.AnoNs 369 (1931). The approach of the Court in the present 
case may have been influenced by the scope of habeas coi:pus proceedings in Ohio. See 
note 1 supra. 
19 See notes 14 and 15 supra. See also State v. Ricketson, 221 La. 691, 60 S. (?d) 88 
(1952). Cf. In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 
Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930) (repudiating full faith doctrines in custody cases so far as the 
state is concerned). And note the readiness with which the courts :find "changed circum-
stances" in order to circumvent the foreign decree. GooDRICH, CoNPLicr OP LA.ws, 3d ed., 
423 (1949). ·. 
20Jn general, this was the view in Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930). 
But see 81 Umv. PA. L. REv. 970 (1933). 
21 UDifoxm legislation providing for interstate cooperation between courts acting on 
their own initiative has been suggested. Ehrenzweig, ''Interstate Recognition ol: Custody 
Decrees," 51 MICH. L. R:sv. 345 at 372-374 (1953). 
